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DEFUSING THE BUG BOMB:
LEGAL STRATEGIES TO COMBAT
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANT
INFECTIONS
ANDREW GELTMAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Antibiotics are truly a miraculous class of drugs1 that have saved many
lives.2 With the development of antibiotics, certain diseases that were once
considered death sentences are now simple infections that are easy to cure
and control.3 Although many other classes of drugs were developed in the
20th century to fight microbial infections, none have proven as successful as
antibiotics.4 The success of antibiotics is, however, leading to overprescription and use of these drugs.5
The overuse of antibiotics has created a potential public health
menace—the growth of microbial infections resistant to them.6 Antibiotic
Copyright © 2015 by Andrew Geltman.
*J.D. and Health Law Certificate Candidate 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law; B.A., Government, Franklin & Marshall College, 2012. The author would like to
thank the entire staff of the Journal of Health Care Law and Policy for their support in developing
this Article. He would also like to thank the professors of the law school and all of his friends and
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1. In describing the drugs’ consequential importance, U.S. Surgeon General William H.
Stewart once said, “[t]he time has come to close the book on infectious diseases.” William Sage &
David Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional
Capacity, 84 TUL. L. REV. 781, 784 (2010).
2. See Cory Fox, Resisting Antibiotic Resistance: Legal Strategies To Maintain Man’s
Dominion Over Microbes, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 35, 37 (2011) (discussing how
antibiotics have been some of the most important and successful drugs in the treatment of
disease).
3. Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 783 (noting that the rise of antibiotics eliminated once
common causes of death, such as pneumonia and puerperal fever).
4. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 2, at 37 (stating that penicillin is one of the most successful
treatments ever developed by mankind).
5. Sage & Hyman, supra note 1 (stating that persistent misuse and overuse of antibiotics is
creating antibiotic resistance).
6. Id.
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resistance stems from many causes that include the use of antibiotics in
animal feed,7 medical practitioners’ over-prescription, the general public’s
misuse of the drugs, and the failure to develop new antibiotics.8 This has
led to the development of so called “super bugs” that are often immune to
first line antibiotic therapies, such as penicillin, and to more powerful,
broad-spectrum treatments.9
The Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) has recognized this threat to
public health.10 In a recent interview, the director of the CDC, Thomas R.
Frieden, stated that “without urgent action now, more patients will be thrust
back to a time before we had effective drugs.”11 The CDC highlights the
extent of the problem, approximating that, as a “very conservative
estimate,” nearly two million Americans are infected each year with
antibiotic resistant infections12 and that 23 thousand Americans die as a
result of such infections.13 The World Health Organization (“WHO”)
estimates that antibiotic resistant infections cost the U.S. health system
between 20–35 million dollars.14 Steve Solomon, the director of
antimicrobial resistance for the CDC, stated: “[w]e need to act now. We do
not have antibiotics in the pipeline that are going to be available soon
enough to address those problems.”15

7. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANT THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2013); see also Recommendations
for Drug Sponsors for Voluntarily Aligning Product Use Conditions with GFI 209, 77 Fed. Reg.
22,327 (2012) (stating the FDA’s concern in the use of antibiotics in animal feed, and providing
guidance on the use of antibiotics in it).
8. See Growing Antibiotic Resistance, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2013, 8:12 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/growing-antibioticresistance/2013/09/16/b61ac100-1f2d-11e3-8459-657e0c72fec8_graphic.html (noting that the lack
of development of new antibiotics and their over-prescription by doctors).
9. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 5 (discussing how
antibiotic resistant infections are common, and that many first and second line antibiotics are on
the verge of becoming ineffective treatments against them).
10. Id.
11. Brady Dennis & Brian Vastag, Drug-Resistant Bacteria Pose Potential Catastrophe, CDC
Warns, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/drug-resistant-bacteria-pose-potential-catastrophe-cdc-warns/2013/09/16/4cd2d482-1ed611e3-b7d1-7153ad47b549_story.html.
12. Id.
13. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 6.
14. Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, PCAST
Releases New Report on Combating Antibiotic Resistance (Sept. 18, 2014, 2:00 PM) (on file with
author), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/18/pcast-releases-new-reportcombating-antibiotic-resistance.
15. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11.
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The costs of antibiotic resistant infections to human life and the
economy are high, but are potentially avoidable with prompt action.16 If we
are going to “defuse the bug bomb” and address the problem of antibiotic
resistant infections, we need to take action to limit the use of current drugs
and to develop new antibiotics.17 Congress has not adequately addressed
this problem; while several bills have been introduced in Congress to
address antibiotic resistant infections,18 these bills failed to address the real
cause of superbugs. Instead, these bills focused on the use of antibiotics in
livestock, and in any event, failed to become laws.19 Although the use of
antibiotics in the agricultural industry is problematic, the CDC does not
consider antibiotic use in livestock as the primary source of antibiotic
resistant infections that threaten humans.20 Rather, the CDC considers the
primary source of antibiotic resistant infections in humans to come from our
overuse of antibiotics and the failure to develop new antibiotics.21 In the
words of the director of the CDC, “[t]he most resistant organisms in
hospitals are emerging in those settings because of poor anti-microbial
stewardship among humans.”22 Thus, this Article focuses on legal strategies
both to control the use of antibiotics, and to develop antibiotic drug
therapies to halt the spread of antibiotic resistant infections from person to
person.
II.

LEGAL STRATEGIES TO COMBAT ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE

Since congressional action has failed to address the impending public
health crisis23 that the CDC has identified,24 the executive branch should
16. See id. (stating that concerted and prompt effort is needed by the nation to combat
antibiotic resistance).
17. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 12 (discussing the need
for aggressive action to combat antibiotic resistance).
18. See, e.g., Strategies to Address Antimicrobial Resistance Act, H.R. 3697, 110th Cong.
(2007) (seeking to fund data collection and awareness programs to fight the spread of antibiotic
resistant infections) [hereinafter Proposed Bill]; see also Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical
Treatment Act, H.R. 2400, 111th Cong. (2009) (seeking to take drastic actions to combat
antibiotic resistant infections by banning the use of antibiotics in livestock feed, and creating
tough approval standards for the use of new antibiotics on animals) [hereinafter Proposed Bill].
19. See Proposed Bills, supra note 18; cf. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
supra note 7 (stating that human overuse in the medical context is the major cause of the
development of antibiotic resistance).
20. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7; see also Dennis & Vastag,
supra note 11 (stating that the major factor leading to antibiotic resistance is the overuse of the
drug).
21. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 11–12.
22. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11.
23. See Proposed Bills, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7.
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work within the existing legal framework to address super bugs. Within the
existing legal framework, it is possible for the executive branch to take
various actions that promote better stewardship of antibiotics through direct
government regulation and the development of new classes of antibiotic
drug therapies.25
Through various statutes, the executive branch has the capacity to
expediently address the issues of overuse of antibiotics and the failure to
develop new drugs.26 For example, the federal government could
incorporate antibiotics into the Controlled Substances Act of 1970
(“CSA”).27 While it is possible and desirable to control antibiotics
domestically through the normal scheduling process in the CSA,28 there is a
potentially faster route. Another possible avenue to address this problem is
to incorporate the control of antibiotics into an executive agreement.29
Since the problem of antibiotic resistance is an international problem, this
kind of agreement might be a more effective way to control the supply of
current drugs on the market than through purely domestic control.30
In addition to controlling the overuse of antibiotics, the government
can take steps to promote the development of new antibiotics. The federal
government can use various governmental programs that are intended to
promote the development and stockpile of prophylactics to also counter
potential public health emergencies in encouraging the development of
antibiotics.31 For example, the federal government could use Project
BioShield (a program originally intended to subsidize the development of
new drugs to counter chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological threats)
to subsidize the development of new antibiotics.32 Further, the federal

25. See Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept.
23, 2014) (ordering various executive agencies to use all of the authority at their disposal to
combat antibiotic resistance).
26. See id. (ordering executive agencies to use all available legal means at their disposal to
combat antibiotic resistance).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012).
28. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (stating the authorities of various executive agencies and the
scheduling process under the CSA).
29. See Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (holding that when Congress
fails to act in an important foreign policy matter, the President has the authority to act).
30. See Editorial Board, Antibiotic Resistance is a Huge Threat to Human Health, WASH.
POST (May 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/antibiotic-resistance-is-a-hugethreat-to-human-health/2014/05/05/96b0279e-d23b-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html
(discussing the global reach of antibiotic resistance and how it is a large threat to the world’s
public health); see also Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg.
56,931 (Sept. 23, 2014).
31. Project BioShield Act of 2004, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
32. Press Release, George Bush, President of the United States, Remarks at the Rose Garden
at the Signing of S.15-Project BioShield Act of 2004 (July 21, 2004, 9:43 AM) (on file with
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government could spur demand for new antibiotics by committing to
purchase the newly developed drugs for the Strategic National Stockpile
(“SNS”), a national stockpile of prophylactic countermeasures that would
be released in the event of a public health crisis.33 Once the federal
government has placed antibiotics in Project BioShield and a company has
contracted to develop them, the government could prioritize the
development of new antibiotics that can treat superbugs pursuant to the
Defense Production Act of 1950, which allows the President to order
companies to give priority to government contracts that are needed to
promote the national defense.34 Lastly, the President could acquire the
authority to prevent the spread of antibiotic resistant infections through the
incorporation of superbugs into Executive Order 13295,35 which
enumerates the President’s quarantine authority. Taken together, use of
these various legal options will limit and control the use of existing
antibiotics, inhibit the spread of superbugs, and create a more viable
antibiotic marketplace that encourages the development of novel therapies.
The purpose of this Article is to briefly review and discuss the legality and
feasibility of each of these avenues of executive action.
A.

Use of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) to Limit the Overuse
of Existing Antibiotics

The CDC and WHO have stated that in order to control the spread of
antibiotic resistant infections and maintain the effectiveness of antibiotics, it
is important to limit their use.36 Under existing federal law, the CSA is a
primary means of controlling the supply of drugs.37 The CSA allows the
federal government to control the uses of certain drugs and even eliminate
classes of drugs from the market.38 As a result, the CSA can serve as a
principal means of controlling drug over-prescription by adding
disincentives to prescribing drugs when it is not appropriate to do so (for
author),
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040721-2.html.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b (2012).
34. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071 (2012).
35. Revised List of Quarantinable Diseases, Executive Order 13674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671
(Aug. 6, 2014).
36. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 11–12; see also Dennis &
Vastag, supra note 11 (stating that the CDC would like to eliminate the unnecessary use of
antibiotics in order to promote their continued effectiveness).
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (granting the Attorney General authority to regulate and
control substances that meet the requirements of the CSA).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012); see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532
U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (noting how the CSA eliminates all uses of marijuana from the market
except for uses within a government approved research project).
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example, the CSA could attach various penalties to the over-prescription of
antibiotics).39
The CSA grants broad discretionary authority to the Attorney General
(“AG”) and the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) to
schedule drugs.40 Under the CSA, the Secretary and the AG divide the
scheduling authority.41 The AG is responsible for promulgating rules
relating only to the registration and control of the “efficient execution of his
functions” under the statute.42 The Secretary is responsible for making
medical judgments and scientific determinations so that the federal
government can then schedule a drug.43 Under the CSA, the Secretary must
make the necessary scientific and medical determinations before the AG
can exercise his authority.44 The scheduling process takes between six to
twelve months;45 scheduling can occur immediately, however, under the
temporary authority of the AG.46 Further, the AG can delegate his
temporary scheduling authority to the Secretary.47 As a result, the AG can
immediately schedule antibiotics on a temporary basis, or the AG can
delegate such authority to the Secretary.48
The normal scheduling process requires the AG or the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)—the agency with the AG’s
delegated authority—to consider seven factors before scheduling is
authorized: (1) the actual or potential abuse of the drug; (2) the scientific
evidence of its pharmacological effect; (3) the state of current scientific
knowledge; (4) the history and current pattern of abuse of the drug; (5) the
scope, duration, and significance of the abuse; (6) the risks to the public

39. BRIAN YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30722, DRUG OFFENSES: MAXIMUM FINES AND
TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
AND RELATED LAWS 3 (2012) (stating that the punishment for a first-time violation of the CSA
for a schedule V drug ranges from a $100,000–250,000 fine to up to 1 year in prison).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2012); see also Touby v. U.S., 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991) (holding that
the broad discretionary authority granted to the AG through the CSA is not a violation of the nondelegation doctrine).
41. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 265 (2006).
42. Id. at 259.
43. Id. at 265.
44. Touby, 500 U.S. at 162 (“A substance cannot be scheduled if the Secretary recommends
against it.”).
45. Id. at 163 (“From the time when law enforcement identify a dangerous new drug, it
typically takes 6 to 12 months to add it to one of the schedules.”).
46. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 811(h) (2012)) (“Congress in 1984 amended the Act to create an
expedited procedure by which the Attorney General can schedule a substance on a temporary
basis when doing so is ‘necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public safety.’”).
47. Id. at 169 (discussing how the court has interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 501(a) to permit the
delegation of any function vested in the AG unless a specific limit on that delegation appears
elsewhere in the statute).
48. Id.
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health; and (7) the psychic or physiological dependence liability.49 The
CSA mandates that the Secretary make any scientific findings before the
AG can exercise his authority to schedule a drug.50 Since the CDC is part of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and therefore under the Secretary’s
authority, the CDC has already reached numerous findings on the effects
and dangers of the misuse of antibiotics.51 Therefore, the key to scheduling
antibiotics under the CSA is for the Secretary to use this prior work to
establish scientific findings that such misuse constitutes a threat to public
health, and that control of the drug is justified.52
1.

Antibiotics meet the statutory requirements for scheduling

Antibiotics should qualify under most of the CSA’s various scheduling
requirements. The CDC reports that antibiotics are the most commonly
prescribed drugs and that up to 50% of all antibiotics prescribed are
unnecessary.53 Vicky Fraser, a member of the Infectious Diseases Society
of America’s antimicrobial resistance committee, states that, “[o]ften when
people are sick with viral infections, they want an antibiotic. . . . There is a
misperception that antibiotics help everything, even viral infections.”54
These misperceptions have led to the actual abuse of the drug,55 and will
lead to continued misuse without further controls.56 There is little doubt that
the misuse of antibiotics has substantially led to the rise of antibiotic
resistant infections,57 and that this constitutes an actual abuse of the drug
with widespread misuse.58 The current pattern of abuse occurs because of a
multitude of factors, one of which is that “[o]ften people use antibiotics
because they’re worried” and “[t]here’s pressure . . . to feel like they are
doing something.”59

49. 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(1)–(7).
50. Touby, 500 U.S. at 162.
51. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7 (discussing the medical and
economic harms that antibiotic resistant infections cause).
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(6) (2012) (noting that the danger of the drug to the public health is
a factor that should be taken into account when making scheduling decisions).
53. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7.
54. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11.
55. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7.
56. Id. at 12 (“Bacteria will inevitably find ways of resisting the antibiotics we develop,
which is why aggressive action is needed now to keep new resistance from developing and to
prevent the resistance that already exists from spreading.”).
57. Id. at 11.
58. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (noting that a drug with widespread misuse is an important
factor when scheduling a drug).
59. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11.
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The widespread misuse of these drugs constitutes a public health threat
because it leads to the development of superbugs.60 More and more
pathogens are becoming resistant to antibiotics and are becoming
increasingly deadly.61 A prime example of such a pathogen is Carbapenemresistant Enterobacteriaceae (“CRE”).62 According to the CDC, CRE has
become resistant to almost all of the antibiotics currently available.63 The
disease results in roughly 600 deaths per year, and half of all bloodstream
infections caused by CRE result in death.64 Many in the medical profession
refer to CRE as the “nightmare bacteria.”65 Cases of CRE were documented
throughout the country in hospitals, and even resulted in the deaths of seven
people under the care of the prestigious National Institutes of Health
(“NIH”).66 The rise of resistant infections is connected to both the use of
antibiotics when they are not needed, and when doctors prescribe antibiotics
to meet the emotional demands of patients.67 The abuse of antibiotics for
psychic reasons is, in part, responsible for deaths from CRE and other
antibiotic resistant infections.68 The aggregation of individual abuses of
antibiotics leads to the rise of resistant infections and pose a great threat to
public health.69 Antibiotics thereby satisfy the “public health” prong for
scheduling.70
There is only one statutory requirement that poses a potential problem
for scheduling antibiotics: the drug’s psychic or physiological dependence
liability.71 There is little, if any, risk for the development of physiological
dependence on antibiotics;72 there is some risk, however, for an emotional
60. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 28 (noting that the misuse
of antibiotics overtime has lead to an increasing number of antibiotic resistant infections).
61. See id. at 15–17 (listing the various drug resistant infections).
62. Id. at 53–54.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11.
66. Id.
67. See id. (discussing the over-prescription of antibiotics and connecting their overprescription to meeting the psychic demands of patients); see also CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 28 (noting that shortly after the development of penicillin, antibiotic
resistance began to occur).
68. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 14 (demonstrating the
process by which antibiotic resistance develops).
69. Id. at 41 (discussing how whenever antibiotics are used, it can lead to the development of
antibiotic resistance and how this is especially problematic when antibiotic are misused are
improperly used).
70. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (providing that public health is a factor in the determination
of whether a drug should be scheduled under the Act).
71. § 811(c)(7).
72. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing how
antibiotics are generally safe drugs to use); see also Using Antibiotics Wisely, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/using-antibiotics-wisely-topic-overview (last updated Mar.
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dependence on the drug.73 As previously noted, a large amount of the
overuse of antibiotics comes from patients’ misuse.74
There is some evidence that the misuse of antibiotics is in part due to
many individuals’ need to feel like they are doing something to treat
themselves.75 Patients often seek these drugs—even when they have a viral
infection, which is an infection that antibiotics will not treat.76 Thus, since
there is evidence that individuals use antibiotics for improper emotional
purposes, antibiotics should qualify for scheduling under the CSA.77
Further, the use of antibiotics for psychic purposes can lead to actual
physical harm.78 Antibiotics are responsible for one out of every five
emergency room visits for adverse drug effects.79 Among the most
prevalent adverse reactions are those caused by allergic reactions as well as
the development of Clostridium difficile (“C. difficile”).80 C. difficile is a
bacteria that can lead to a deadly diarrhea, which can develop from
needlessly taking antibiotics.81 The amount of hospitalizations for adverse
reactions to the misuse of antibiotics for psychic purposes alone warrants
scheduling in its own right.82 The harms that directly result from misuse,83
however, coupled with the indirect harms that flow from the development
of resistant infections84 create a strong argument for the AG and the
Secretary to schedule antibiotics.

10, 2013) (noting the list of side effects from antibiotics and how physical dependency is not one
of them).
73. See Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11 (discussing how people take antibiotics out of a sense
of worry that is developed from various social pressures).
74. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7.
75. See, e.g., The Spread of Superbugs, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18483671 (discussing how antibiotics are misused by
hypochondriacs).
76. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 34 (noting the
demands of patients for antibiotics for the purpose of treating viral infections).
77. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(7) (2012) (listing the factors that should be taken into when
making a scheduling determination).
78. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 25 (stating the physical
harms that can result from the misuse of antibiotics).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 26 (noting the 14,000 annual deaths as a result of C. difficile); cf. 21 U.S.C. §
811(c)(6) (2012) (stating that the threat to public health is an important factor in making
scheduling decisions).
83. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 25.
84. Id. at 11.
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Antibiotics should be controlled as a schedule V drug

The CSA establishes a five-tiered “scheduling” program where drugs
are placed into schedules ranked between I–V.85 Schedule I is the most
restrictive, while schedule V is the least restrictive.86 Drugs in schedule I
carry heavy criminal penalties and the drugs are banned for any purpose
other than a government funded research project.87 Drugs scheduled in
classes II through V have “legitimate medical purposes,” and any registered
doctor can prescribe these drugs.88 Drugs prescribed under schedules II
through V must be used “for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual
practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.”89 In
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Co-op, the Court found that
Congress determined that there was no legitimate medical purpose for
schedule I drugs, and that the only legitimate usage of them was for
government approved research.90 Antibiotics should not be classified as a
schedule I drug because they have significant medical benefits.91
The best category fit for antibiotics is schedule V. In order to classify a
drug under schedule V, the following must apply: (1) the drug must have a
low potential for abuse relative to the drugs in schedule IV; (2) the drug
must have a currently accepted medical use in the U.S.; and (3) abuse of the
drug may lead to limited physiological or psychic dependence.92 Antibiotics
satisfy these statutory requirements, and can be classified as a schedule V
drug. First, antibiotics have a low potential for abuse compared to every
other schedule.93 Second, antibiotics have a clearly accepted medical use in
the U.S.—to treat bacterial infections.94 Third, antibiotics are sometimes

85. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a) (2012).
86. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012); see also BRIAN YEH, supra note 39.
87. § 812; see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490
(2001) (holding that all drugs classified as schedule I are not subject to a common law medical
necessity defense).
88. § 812(b)(2)–(5)(B).
89. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2005).
90. 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (“In the case of the Controlled Substances Act, the statute
reflects a determination [by Congress] that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an
exception (outside the confines of a Government-approved research project).”).
91. See
NAT’L
INST.
OF
HEALTH,
Antibiotics,
MEDLINEPLUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/antibiotics.html (last updated Dec. 23, 2014) (discussing the
various medical benefits of antibiotics).
92. § 812(b)(5).
93. See § 812 (noting that the drugs that are already contained within schedule IV and
antibiotics have a smaller psychic or physical dependence liability then schedule IV drugs); see
also Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 816 (discussing the use of the CSA to schedule any newly
developed antibiotics in order to defend their efficacy).
94. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 91.
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prescribed for psychic reasons.95 Antibiotics are the most-prescribed drugs
in the world and are often incorrectly prescribed.96 Therefore, there is an
increased potential for abuse because of the ubiquity and ease of the
availability of antibiotics.97 For these reasons, antibiotics should be
controlled as a schedule V drug under the CSA.
The scheduling of antibiotics would also put physicians on notice that
they need to better control their prescription of antibiotics.98 In United
States v. Moore,99 the U.S. Supreme Court held that being a registered
doctor does not give doctors blanket authorization to distribute or dispense
controlled substances.100 The Court ruled that since the CSA mandates that
doctors must comply with the plain language of the statute and its
implementing regulations, doctors must abide by the restrictions of the CSA
or they will face fines and other possible penalties.101
The benefit of scheduling antibiotics as a class V drug is that it will
result in the least amount of restrictions while also providing patients with a
vital life saving drug.102 Additionally, scheduling limits doctors’
prescription of the drug to medical necessity while also punishing negligent
behavior.103 If antibiotics are so scheduled, then doctors will not be subject
to penalties when they are properly administering antibiotics.104 To avoid
penalties and other risks, doctors would only need to do what they are

95. See Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11 (discussing how people want antibiotics in order to
feel like they are being treated).
96. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7.
97. See Howard Markel, No Prescription for Antibiotics? No Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12,
2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/12/health/no-prescription-for-antibiotics-noproblem.html (discussing how easy it is to get antibiotics in the U.S. without a prescription).
98. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012) (stating that many controlled substances have a legitimate
medical purpose, but that they also pose a detrimental effect to the welfare of the American
people, and that it is important for the federal government to regulate access to them); see also
Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 816 (discussing how the CSA could be used to control the supply
of antibiotics).
99. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
100. Id. at 124 (holding that doctors can be prosecuted for violations of the CSA when their
conduct falls outside the course of professional practice).
101. Id. at 131 (ruling that the CSA only exempts lawful acts from prosecution, and that
doctors are not exempt from the requirements of the statute).
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012) (stating that schedule V drugs have a “currently accepted
medical use in the United States”); see also BRIAN YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34635, THE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS (2012).
103. BRIAN YEH, supra note 39 (noting that the punishment for violating the CSA for a
schedule V drug ranges from a fine from $100,000–250,000 or up to 1 year in prison for the first
violation); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 133 (stating that only the lawful acts of registrants are
exempted from prosecution, which include prescribing antibiotics for legitimate medical
purposes).
104. Moore, 423 U.S. at 140 (holding that the statute was designed to limit the dispensing
authority of controlled substances to activities within the doctor’s professional practice).
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already supposed to do: prescribe antibiotics when it is medically necessary
to do so.105
3. The decision to schedule antibiotics should be upheld by the courts
The CSA grants broad discretionary authority to the executive branch
in determining whether or not a drug should be scheduled.106 This
authority, however, is not granted to one single department of the executive
branch.107 In order to schedule a drug, the Secretary must first make a
scientific determination on its dangers.108 If the Secretary makes a scientific
determination on the health effects of the misuse of antibiotics, the CSA
then authorizes the AG to schedule the drug.109 The courts have generally
given broad deference to the executive branch in the exercise of delegated
discretionary authority.110 The broad deference afforded to the executive
branch should mean that the court would use the findings of the Secretary
and the AG to determine that the scheduling is not “arbitrary and
capricious.”111 In addition, the AG’s decision to schedule antibiotics is not
likely to be considered an unlawful attempt to define the practice of
medicine.112 As a result, the courts will likely uphold the scientific findings
of the secretary and the scheduling decision of the AG.
Under Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council,113 the Court will likely
grant the executive branch broad deference in its scientific findings and
subsequent decision to schedule antibiotics.114 In Chevron, the Court stated
that the judiciary affords substantial deference to an administrative
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.115 The primary issue then becomes

105. Id.
106. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (stating the scheduling authority of various executive branch
departments).
107. Id. (noting how the scheduling process is split between the AG and the Secretary, who are
the heads of two different departments within the executive branch).
108. Id. § 811(b).
109. Id.
110. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1987) (stating that an
administrative agency is generally given broad deference to interpret the statutory regimes they
are entrusted to implement).
111. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stating the conditions by which agency action can be
reviewed); see also 21 U.S.C. § 877 (2012) (stating that findings of fact by the AG are
conclusive).
112. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (upholding the validity of the CSA and
stating that it is a valid regulatory regime that controls the use of substances with medical uses).
113. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1987).
114. Id; see also Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 27 (articulating the broad regulatory powers of the
CSA).
115. 467 U.S. at 844.
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whether the Secretary’s scientific findings, when properly viewed through
the broad deference doctrine afforded to executive decisions under
Chevron, would be arbitrary and capricious.116 The CSA requires that the
Secretary make the findings based upon substantial evidence.117 Under the
CSA’s standard, a court must consider whether “a reasonable mind might
accept a particular evidentiary record as adequate to support a
conclusion.”118 The executive is not required to have absolute medical
certainty in making its determinations, but rather only a legitimate basis to
take action based on the current state of medical evidence.119 The medical
community, including the WHO and the CDC, has developed substantial
evidence of the negative effects of the overuse of antibiotics.120 In addition,
there is well-established evidence of the dramatic adverse public health
effects as a result of the spread of antibiotic resistance.121 The CSA does
not require absolute medical certainty in order for the Secretary to make a
medical finding.122 As a result, the existing evidence on psychic
dependence, even though not conclusive, could still permit scheduling when
it is properly viewed as a public health statute.123 Therefore, overwhelming
evidence of the dangerous overuse and misuse of antibiotics by the public
overshadows the relative uncertainty as to the potential liability for
dependence on antibiotics.124 Thus, when viewed in its totality, the courts
will likely afford the medical record Chevron deference, and will likely
deem scheduling of antibiotics lawful.125
The CSA grants discretionary authority to the AG to decide which
substances should be registered and controlled; the Secretary, however,

116. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (setting forth the arbitrary and capricious standard for agency
action); 21 U.S.C. § 877 (2012).
117. See Am. for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 450 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (stating that the CSA directs courts to review the agency’s findings of substantial findings).
118. Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999)).
119. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (stating that scheduling decisions must be made based on the
current state of scientific understanding); see also Am. for Safe Access, 706 F.3d at 450 (applying
a reasonable person standard to the adequacy of data used to make scientific findings).
120. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7 (discussing the various
negative effects from the overuse of antibiotics).
121. Id.
122. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 930 F.2d 936, 939
(1991) (stating that absolute medical certainty is not needed to meet the statutory requirements for
scheduling).
123. 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(6) (2012) (requiring the Secretary to determine what, if any, risk exists
to the public health).
124. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7 (noting the volume of
evidence demonstrating that the overuse of antibiotics causes a threat to the public health).
125. See, e.g., Am. for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 452 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (holding that the scientific determination that marijuana has no valid medical use, in spite of
evidence to the contrary, was not an invalid finding by the agency).
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cannot trigger this authority without appropriate medical findings.126 In
order for the AG to schedule a drug as arbitrary and capricious, the AG
must do so without scientific findings from the Secretary, and the AG’s
actions must constitute an attempt to define the practice of medicine.127 In
Gonzales v. Oregon,128 the Court ruled that the AG acted beyond his
statutory authority when he used his rulemaking authority under the CSA
because the AG’s regulation sought to define the practice of medicine and
was made without a scientific finding from the Secretary.129 In United
States v. Moore,130 the Court granted the AG broad authority to criminalize
improper drug dispensing practices that lead to the harm of patients.131 The
Court, however, limited the authority of the AG to scheduling drugs when
such action defines what constitutes the practice of medicine.132 Based on
this rationale, the Court in Oregon found that the AG does not have the
authority to promulgate regulations under the CSA that would criminalize
the prescription of drugs to assist patient suicide.133 The AG determined
that the physician’s purpose of dispensing of drugs for assisted suicides was
not within the legitimate medical practice, and that this practice was
unlawful under the CSA.134 The Court stated that Congress delegated
limited authority to the AG for creating regulations pursuant to the control
of drugs. Under the CSA, “control” means “to add a drug or substance to a
schedule.”135 The AG does not, however, have the authority to define
which acts are within the practice of medicine.136 Rather, the states have the
authority to determine what constitutes the practice of medicine.137 If the
state deems an action as within the practice of medicine, the AG cannot
then make a regulation that criminalizes the action under the CSA.138
The scheduling of antibiotics under the CSA does not constitute an
impermissible attempt to define the practice of medicine as articulated in

126. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b) (2012); see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 265 (2006).
127. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 264–65.
128. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
129. Id. at 264–65.
130. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
131. Id. at 124.
132. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 261–62.
133. Id. at 261.
134. Id. at 254.
135. 21 U.S.C § 802(5) (2009).
136. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 272.
137. Id. at 270 (interpreting the CSA as relying upon state based definitions for the practice of
medicine).
138. Id. at 262 (highlighting the efforts of Congress to refuse granting authority to the AG to
define what constitutes the practice of medicine).

2015]

DEFUSING THE BUG BOMB

129

the Oregon decision.139 First, in Oregon, the Court was faced with a
situation where the state had affirmatively determined that physicianassisted suicide was within legitimate practice of medicine via a statute.140
Currently, there is no affirmative statute allowing for the use of antibiotics
for any reason other than treating bacterial infections.141 The scheduling of
antibiotics only seeks to control the use of antibiotics in situations when it is
not medically appropriate to do so.142 Second, unlike Oregon, the AG
would be scheduling antibiotics only once the Secretary has made proper
scientific findings.143 Third, unlike Oregon, when scheduling antibiotics,
the AG would not be seeking to define a specific act that is not within the
legitimate exercise of the practice of medicine, but rather would seek to
schedule a whole class of drugs in order to promote the public health.144 By
scheduling antibiotics under the CSA, the AG is only attempting to bar
doctors from prescribing drugs when it is not medically required.145 Such a
requirement does not conflict with state law or a state’s determination of
what constitutes the practice of medicine.146 In fact, scheduling serves to
complement the state’s definition of the practice of medicine by attaching
penalties to actions that doctors should not be taking. 147 Thereby, the
scheduling of antibiotics merely adds additional disincentives to actions that
doctors should already not be taking.148

139. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (noting the ability of the government to
control the use of substances with legitimate medical uses under the CSA without constituting an
impermissible attempt to define the practice of medicine).
140. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1999); see also Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 252.
141. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3303 (2010) (stating that prescription drugs, including
antibiotics, can only be issued for legitimate therapeutic reasons).
142. United States v. Moore, 443 U.S. 122, 131–32 (1975) (holding that lawful acts of doctors
who are registered under the act are exempt from criminal liability).
143. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 253–54 (noting that the AG’s regulation of the use of drugs to assist
patients in suicide was unlawful under the CSA because the AG failed to acquire a scientific
finding from the Secretary).
144. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 27; see also 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1973) (discussing the purpose of
the CSA).
145. Moore, 423 U.S. at 140–41 (1975) (stating that doctors can dispense drugs when it falls
within his professional practice); see also United States v. Kanner, 603 F.3d 530, 535 (8th Cir.
2010) (upholding the ruling of Moore after the Oregon decision, ruling that distributing drugs
outside the course of professional practice constitutes a criminal violation of the CSA).
146. Moore, 423 U.S. at 141; see also Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 24 (noting that the scheduling of
drugs is not an attempt to define the practice of medicine, but rather a regulatory action to control
the misuse of drugs with legitimate medical uses to protect the general welfare of the American
people).
147. Moore, at 144 (“[The] implication is that physicians who go beyond approved practice
remain subject to serious criminal penalties.”).
148. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3303 (2010) (noting that under Virginia state law, the
prescription of any drug without medical necessity is a criminal violation).
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The plain language of the CSA and the Oregon decision itself grants
broad authority to the Secretary to schedule drugs as long as the Secretary
makes the necessary medical findings, and that the class of drugs can satisfy
all of the statutory requirements for scheduling.149 The Oregon decision
does not bar the AG and the Secretary from exercising their broad
discretionary authority to choose which drugs to schedule.150 Oregon only
bars the AG from defining what constitutes the practice of medicine when
the states have already done so.151 As a result, the scheduling of antibiotics,
if done according to the normal scheduling process, would likely be upheld
as a valid exercise of statutory authority of the Secretary and the AG.
B.

The Use of Executive Agreements to Control the Improper Use of
Antibiotics

Antibiotics satisfy all of the statutory requirements for scheduling
under the CSA; it may be more effective, however, to control antibiotics
through international agreements.152 This makes sense because the problem
of antibiotic resistant infections is not uniquely an American problem. 153 In
recent reports, the CDC and WHO have stated that antibiotic resistance is a
problem that does not recognize political boundaries and will likely require
international cooperation to effectively combat.154 An international
agreement on the use of antibiotics could potentially provide more effective
control of the spread of antibiotic resistant infections than scheduling would
under purely domestic authority.155 Coordinating U.S. efforts with other
countries would likely reduce antibiotic resistant infections from entering
American borders, and would reduce global misuse of antibiotics.156
Moreover, the use of an international agreement to control antibiotics for
the purposes of fighting antibiotic resistance and preventing a public health

149. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 260 (2006).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 270 (stating that the CSA “piggybacks” off of state law and relies on it to define
what falls within the legitimate practice of medicine).
152. See Nat’l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 559 F.2d
735, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing the how the AG may schedule a drug in order to meet an
international obligation without regard to the normal scheduling process).
153. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 27 (noting the lack of
international surveillance systems); see also Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11.
154. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7; see also Dennis & Vastag,
supra note 11 (discussing the international nature of antibiotic resistance and the particular
importance of combating resistant infections); see also Combating Antibiotic Resistance,
Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 23, 2014).
155. See supra note 152.
156. See supra note 152.
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crisis can occur without any further congressional action.157 Although the
Constitution requires the President to ratify treaties with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate,158 an executive agreement (an
agreement between the executive branch of the United States and the
executive of a foreign country without the approval of the Senate)159 can
occur without such approval.160 As a result, the agreement becomes a de
facto treaty.161 In Dames and Moores v. Regan, the Court stated that when
Congress acquiesces its responsibility to resolve important matters of
foreign policy, the President can take action to resolve such matters.162 So
far, Congress has acquiesced in regards to the issue of antibiotic resistant
infections by failing to pass legislation163 even in the face of warnings of
the impending public health crisis from both domestic and international
health authorities.164 In these circumstances, the President could enter into
an executive agreement with other countries to take measures to halt the
spread of antibiotic resistant infections.
C.

Project BioShield Could Provide a Basis to Spur New Antibiotic
Development

The CSA provides for an effective means of controlling the use of
existing antibiotics. Antibiotic stewardship alone, however, is not sufficient
to halt the spread of antibiotic resistant infections; we must also develop
new antibiotics.165 The Project BioShield Act of 2004166 (“Project
BioShield”) was enacted in order to spur the development of
157. See Dames & Moores v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (discussing the President’s
authority to act in the international realm in the absence of congressional authorization).
158. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
159. Treaty vs. Executive Agreement, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70133.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (stating that the
difference between an executive agreement and a treaty is that a treaty is done with the advice and
consent of the Senate, while an executive agreement is an international agreement entered into
solely through the constitutional authority of the President).
160. United States v. Pink, 315 US 203, 229–30 (1942).
161. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 723.2-2(C) AGREEMENTS
PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT (2006) (discussing when an
international agreement can be entered into based solely on the President’s constitutional powers
without the advice and consent of the Senate).
162. 453 U.S. at 688.
163. Proposed Bills, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
164. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Ctr. For Disease Control &
Prevention
(May
1,
2014)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/s0430-who-antibiotic-resistance.html.
165. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 44 (noting that bacterial
infections will inevitably evolve and as a result, new antibiotics will need to be developed).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6a (2012).
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countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(“CBRN”) threats.167 The law was passed in the wake of 9/11 and the
anthrax attacks.168 These attacks created widespread fear in America, and
highlighted the nation’s vulnerability to CBRN threats due to a lack of
effective countermeasures.169 While Project BioShield was passed with the
intent of preventing and mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks,170 the
language of the statute does not limit the development of countermeasures
for that purpose alone.171 Project BioShield authorizes the Secretary to
grant research and development funds to “qualified countermeasures.”172 A
“qualified countermeasure” is defined as any medical product that the
Secretary deems necessary to treat any biological agent, including
organisms that cause infectious disease that may cause a public health
emergency affecting national security.173
Project BioShield was developed because of the failures of the market
system to produce countermeasures to CBRN threats.174 As with the failure
to produce countermeasures to CBRN threats, the market has also failed to
develop new antibiotics to combat resistant infections.175 The Secretary
could use the broad discretionary authority granted to him under Project
BioShield in order to deem novel antibiotics as “qualified
countermeasure[s].”176 The Secretary has substantial evidence showing that
the public’s vulnerability to various resistant diseases is so dangerous to the
public health that it threatens the nation’s security.177 Placing antibiotics
167. Press Release, George Bush, President of the United States, Remarks at the Rose Garden
at the Signing of S.15-Project BioShield Act of 2004 (July 21, 2004, 9:43 AM) (on file with
author),
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040721-2.html (discussing the reasons why
Project BioShield was passed into law, and the policy goals of the legislation).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. § 247d-6a(1) (noting that the Secretary’s authority extends to “qualified
countermeasures,” which includes anything that may treat harm from a biological agent (including
organisms that cause infectious diseases)).
172. § 247d-6a(a)(2)(A)(i).
173. Id.
174. FRANK GOTTRON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41033, PROJECT BIOSHIELD:
AUTHORITIES, APPROPRIATIONS, ACQUISITIONS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2011).
175. Fox, supra note 2, at 45–46 (stating that the lack of new antibiotics is largely because of
market failures); see also INFECTIOUS DISEASE SOC’Y OF AM., BAD BUGS, NO DRUGS: AS
ANTIBIOTICS DISCOVERY STAGNATES, A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREWS 16 (2004) (stating that
the success of antibiotics in treating disease serves as a disincentive to drug producers to develop
new antibiotics).
176. § 247d-6a(a)(2)(A)(i).
177. Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 23,
2014) (noting that the President has declared antibiotic resistance as a threat to national security
and made this determination using evidence provided by the CDC).
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under Project BioShield allows for the use of a five billion dollar fund to
subsidize the development of new antibiotics, and in addition, Project
BioShield provides a market guarantee for these products.178 The
government guarantees a market for any developed drugs by agreeing that
any developed drug will be incorporated into the SNS.179 The SNS is a
stockpile of countermeasures that the government holds in reserve
throughout the country in the event that there is a catastrophic public health
emergency.180 It is necessary to develop new antibiotics in order to ensure
the continued effectiveness of current drugs, as well as to widen treatment
options against resistant infection strains.181 Therefore, HHS should use its
broad authority to incorporate antibiotics into the Project BioShield
program.182 The inclusion of antibiotics into Project BioShield would
recognize the growing threat that antibiotic resistant infections pose to the
nation while also providing an important market incentive to private
companies to develop new drugs.
Project BioShield grants the HHS Secretary (in concurrence with the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and upon
approval of the President) the authority to purchase a countermeasure up to
eight years before the drug is developed and delivered.183 In order to
provide an additional incentive beyond the market guarantee, HHS is
authorized to deliver up to half of the payment for the drug before it is even
successfully developed.184 The purpose of this provision is to subsidize the
substantial amount of money needed in order to develop new drugs.185
Many experts believe that it can cost up to one billion dollars to develop
any given new prophylactic.186 Incorporating antibiotics into the pool of
drugs that the government seeks to develop through Project BioShield will
likely result in the development of more powerful antibiotics that can
effectively combat resistant infections. Moreover, placing antibiotics into
Project BioShield will help overcome the lack of financial incentives to
create new drugs in the current market.187 The federal government can also
178. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 5.
179. Id. at 2.
180. § 247d-6b(a).
181. Fox, supra note 2, at 61.
182. § 247d-6a (noting that the Secretary can use their authority to approve the development
for any “qualified countermeasure”).
183. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 2–3.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1.
186. Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES (Feb. 10,
2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggeringcost-of-inventing-new-drugs/ (stating that the cost to develop new drugs is around 1.3 billion
dollars).
187. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 3.
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create a guaranteed market and provide advance funding in order to help
subsidize high research and development costs, motivating drug companies
to develop new drugs.188
1.

Project BioShield allows the federal government to promote
stewardship of newly developed antibiotics

If new antibiotics are developed under Project BioShield, the major
consumer of the drugs will be the federal government.189 The government
will have control over a major supply of the drug, and as a result, will be in
a better position to promote stewardship over new antibiotics.190 Although
the drug will still be available to the general public for use when it is
medically necessary, the government’s control over the supply will make it
more difficult for new drugs to be overused.191 The federal government’s
withholding of a large supply of the drug on the open market will help
maintain a higher price for the drug, causing it to only be used when
medically necessary.192 The prospect of a higher market price will further
incentivize drug companies to develop new antibiotics.193 The use of
Project BioShield will not only lead to the development of new drugs, but
will help control the supply of the drugs in a manner that promotes the long
term effectiveness of antibiotics.194

188. Id. (noting that the incentives of Project BioShield substantially reduces the risks of
private investment by providing a guaranteed market and funds).
189. See, e.g., Steve Sternberg, U.S. Government Stockpiles New, Safer Smallpox Vaccine,
USA TODAY (May 25, 2010, 1:37 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2010-05-25smallpox25_ST_N.htm (discussing how the U.S. has stockpiled over 300 million doses of
smallpox vaccine as part of the SNS, and demonstrating how the market guarantee can be an
effective incentive for the production of new countermeasures).
190. See Fox, supra note 2, at 61 (stating that in order to combat antibiotic resistant infections,
there must be effective drug stewardship, and new drugs must be developed).
191. Id. (noting that the market guarantee will cause a substantial portion of any produced
antibiotic to be under direct government supervision in the SNS, and thereby not available for
public consumption on the open market).
192. Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 814 (discussing how government stockpiling will reduce
the supply of available drugs to the general public).
193. See Alexandra Sifferlin, Why Reducing Antibiotic Resistance Is Harder Than It Seems,
TIME (Sep. 19, 2014), http://time.com/3403542/combating-antibiotic-resistance/ (discussing the
influence of price, and how federal incentives can be changed to increase prices of antibiotics and
encourage development).
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b (2012) (discussing the procurement process under Project
BioShield as well as the stockpiling of drugs in the SNS, which controls the supply of newly
developed drugs while also providing a market guarantee that encourages their development).
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Potential funding limitations of Project BioShield

Like many federal government programs, Project BioShield is not
without its flaws. The primary problem with Project BioShield is that
Congress transferred many of the funds originally appropriated to the
program to other parts of the government.195 As a result, Project
BioShield’s funding stream to purchase drugs is not stable.196 The
instability in funding creates a disincentive to private companies seeking
funds to develop drugs pursuant to the program. 197 The instability of
funding is particularly problematic because the upfront costs of developing
new drugs are extremely high.198 While lack of steady funding could inhibit
the prospect of developing new antibiotics under the program, it is not
conclusive.199 The market incentives currently in place (the SNS and
prepayment programs in concert with normal market forces) create a
powerful economic incentive for private corporations to actually develop
new antibiotics that can overcome the flaws of Project BioShield.200 Unlike
antibiotics, CBRN countermeasures can only be used in the event of a crisis
and only have one true purchaser: the government.201 New antibiotics are
not limited to use only in the event of a crisis.202 Rather, antibiotics have
broader appeal and are more regularly used by the general public.203

195. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 5 (discussing how funds have been transferred out of
Project BioShield, creating an unstable funding source for prospective users of the program).
196. Id. (stating that funds have been rescinded and transferred out of Project BioShield,
creating an unstable fund instead of the dedicated 5 billion dollar fund that was originally
intended).
197. Id.
198. Herper, supra note 186 (stating that the cost of developing new drugs are extraordinarily
high, and as a result, instability in funding sources creates additional risks that may serve as an
additional disincentive to development of new antibiotics).
199. See, e.g., Sternberg, supra note 189 (discussing how the U.S. has stockpiled over 300
million doses of smallpox vaccine as part of the SNS, and demonstrating how the SNS and the
market guarantee can lead to large orders for products by the government, which serves as a
substantial incentive for development).
200. See, e.g., Sten Stovall, EU Joins Widening Push to Find New Antibiotics, WALL ST.
JOURNAL
(May
24,
2012,
8:41
AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304707604577423683954355876
(discussing how financial incentives and other government efforts can encourage drug companies
to develop new antibiotics).
201. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 11 (noting how the pharmaceutical market has failed to
produce CBRN countermeasures and that the government provides a market guarantee for CBRN
countermeasure development); see also, e.g., Sternberg, supra note 189 (providing an example of
how the government is the true purchaser of CBRN countermeasures).
202. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 91 (stating that antibiotics fight various bacterial
infections).
203. Stovall, supra note 200 (discussing the importance of antibiotics to the practice of
medicine and their widespread use and appeal).
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Antibiotics do not have the problem of only having the government as its
sole purchaser.204 Instead, antibiotics are an important prophylactic that the
government wants to purchase, and are also medicines that the general
public will use outside of a crisis situation.205 As a result, the development
of new antibiotics under Project BioShield is far more likely to occur than
CBRN countermeasures.206
D.

Priority Development of New Antibiotics Through the Use of the
Defense Production Act

Another legal tool in the President’s arsenal to fight superbugs is to
exercise his authority pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950
(“DPA”),207 where the President can order the priority performance of
contracts with drug companies in order to develop new antibiotic
therapies.208 The DPA grants the President legal authority to issue such an
order when he deems it necessary for the national defense. 209 Congress
stated in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act210 that “national defense,” as used in the DPA,211 includes “emergency
preparedness activities.”212 The statutory authorization to include
emergency preparedness activities in the DPA allows the President to order
the prioritization of the development of any new antibiotics developed
under Project BioShield.213 The increasing numbers and lethality of
antibiotic resistant infections combined with a lack of development in the
current marketplace of new antibiotics creates a major public health
threat214 that amounts to a threat to national defense.215

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 7 (noting that several contracts have been cancelled, but that
these contracts were not for countermeasures with the wide market base as antibiotics).
207. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061 (1950).
208. Id. § 2071 (2009).
209. § 2071(a).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 5195a (2012).
211. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(14) (2012).
212. 15 C.F.R. § 700.1 (2014).
213. § 2071 (authorizing the prioritization of any contract to promote the national defense,
which is defined to include “emergency preparedness activities”); see also § 5195a(b) (including,
as part of the emergency preparedness activities, actions that are designed to minimize the effect
of a hazard on the civilian population).
214. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that antibiotic
resistance is a threat because of the increasing lethality and ubiquity of antibiotic resistant
infections).
215. Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 23,
2014) (stating that combating antibiotic resistance is a national security priority).
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A major outbreak of an antibiotic resistant infection is a potential
calamitous event that public health and national security officials cannot
ignore. Each year, antibiotic resistant infections cause twenty-three
thousand Americans to die, and cause two million to become sick.216 A
major and sudden outbreak of an antibiotic resistant infection would lead to
catastrophic results.217 Since antibiotic resistant infections are viewed as a
potential public health threat,218 the nation must prepare for the potential of
such an emergency situation.219 Therefore, the President should be able to
classify the threat caused by antibiotic resistant infections as necessary for
emergency preparedness,220 and should thereby order government
contractors to prioritize the development of new antibiotics to combat the
threat.221
E.

Quarantine Authority and Executive Order No. 13295

A final tool that the President could use to control the spread of
antibiotic resistant infections is to utilize the federal government’s authority
to isolate and quarantine individuals. Executive Order No. 13295 is the
authority upon which the federal government bases its ability to quarantine
individuals.222 The federal government has limited quarantine authority and
does not have the broad police powers of state governments.223 In
Executive Order No. 13295, the federal government has the authority to
quarantine individuals with cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis,
plague, smallpox, yellow fever, severe acute respiratory syndrome
(“SARS”), and viral hemorrhagic fevers.224 Of the 17 listed antibiotic
resistant infections in the CDC’s report, the federal government only has
216. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 6.
217. See, e.g., Jason M. Breslow, Illinois “Nightmare Bacteria” Outbreak Raises Alarms, PBS
(Jan.
8,
2014,
2:59
PM),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/health-sciencetechnology/hunting-the-nightmare-bacteria/illinois-nightmare-bacteria-outbreak-raises-alarms/
(discussing the concern over an outbreak of CRE and its potential for deadly consequences).
218. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 5.
219. Id. at 6.
220. 15 C.F.R. § 700.1(c) (2006) (noting that mitigating the effects of a potential outbreak of
antibiotic resistant infections through the development of new countermeasures qualifies as
emergency preparedness activities).
221. Id. § 700.1(a) (noting that such a prioritization is within the President’s discretion as long
as it is needed for national defense).
222. Revised List of Quarantinable Diseases, Executive Order No. 13674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671
(Aug. 6, 2014).
223. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (holding that states have a primary
role in establishing public health measures, and that states have broad authority to do so based on
its police powers); see also 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2002); see also 42 C.F.R. § 70.6 (2013).
224. Revised List of Quarantinable Diseases, Executive Order No. 13674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671
(Aug. 6, 2014).
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the authority to quarantine individuals with tuberculosis.225 In order to help
promote the effectiveness of antibiotics, it is crucial to slow the spread of
antibiotic resistant infections.226 In preventing the spread of antibiotic
resistant infections, it may be necessary at some point to quarantine
people.227 The federal government’s authority to quarantine individuals
rests on the enumerated diseases in Executive Order No. 13295.228
Currently, the federal government does not have the authority to detain
individuals with antibiotic resistant infections because antibiotic resistant
infections are not listed within the Executive Order.229 The growing
prevalence and lethality of various resistant infections demonstrates that the
17 listed infections in the CDC’s report should be placed within the
Executive Order.230 The President can add diseases to the Executive Order
pursuant to the recommendations of the Secretary of HHS and the Surgeon
General.231 The Secretary of HHS and the Surgeon General could
recommend to the President that antibiotic resistant infections be listed
within the Executive Order. Taking such action does two things: (1) it
provides clear authority to the federal government to quarantine infected
individuals; and (2) provides a broader statement on the public health risk
that such diseases pose.
In combating deadly pathogens, it is important for the federal
government to have every available tool at its disposal. The need for change
in regards to antibiotic resistant infections became clear in 2007 with the
Andrew Speaker incident.232 Andrew Speaker, a personal injury attorney
from Atlanta, became infected with tuberculosis.233 The CDC believed that
he was infected with extensively drug resistant tuberculosis (“XDR”), a
deadly form of resistant tuberculosis.234 It turned out that Speaker was
225. Id.; see also CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 15–17.
226. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 12 (discussing how the
prevention of infections is an essential element of preventing the spread of antibiotic resistance).
227. See Mike Stobbe, TB Quarantine Raises Legal Questions, USA TODAY (June 1, 2007,
5:47
AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-06-01-734645277_x.htm
(discussing the quarantine of Andrew Speaker, who was infected with a resistant form of
tuberculosis).
228. § 70.6.
229. Id. (noting that Executive Order 13295 and its subsequent amendments do not include any
antibiotic resistant infections other than tuberculosis).
230. See Brian Vastag & Lena H. Sun, NIH Superbug Claims 7th Victim, WASH. POST (Sept.
14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/nih-superbug-claims-7thvictim/2012/09/14/09b3742e-fe9b-11e1-b153-218509a954e1_story.html (discussing the outbreak
of a superbug that killed numerous people at the NIH).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 264(b) (2012).
232. Hilary A. Fallow, Reforming Federal Quarantine Laws in the Wake of Andrew Speaker:
the “Tuberculosis Traveler,” 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 83–86 (2008).
233. Id. at 83.
234. Id. at 84–85.
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infected with multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (“MDR”), which is less
deadly, but it is still another virulent strain of tuberculosis.235 While health
officials believed Speaker to be infected with XDR, they also chose to not
exercise their quarantine authority.236 As a result, Speaker was able to
board a plane and expose numerous people to MDR;237 fortunately no one
became infected.238 This incident demonstrates the need for the federal
government to have the clear authority to quarantine individuals with
resistant infections. Quarantine is an important tool in the fight against
resistant infections because it will help slow the spread of infections, and
will increase the effectiveness of antibiotics already on the market.239
III.

CONCLUSION

The solutions to the problem of antibiotic resistant infections proposed
in this Article are drastic and less than ideal. Congressional failure to
address this problem,240 however, suggests the need for drastic executive
action. Antibiotic resistant infections have become a problem of such
magnitude that it arguably represents a threat to the nation’s security. In
these circumstances, the President can employ existing legislation to rapidly
combat and address this problem through several means:241 (1) through the
scheduling process in the CSA, the government can better control the
existing supply of antibiotics to promote antibiotic stewardship;242 (2) the
President can exercise his authority through the incorporation of antibiotics
into Project BioShield;243 (3) the President can use the DPA to encourage
the development of new antibiotics;244 and (4) if necessary—and
appropriate based on the circumstances—antibiotic resistant infections can
be incorporated into Executive Order 13295 in order to grant the federal
government authority to quarantine individuals with antibiotic resistant
infections.245 Overall, the federal government has the authority to regulate
235. Id. at 86.
236. Id. at 84; see also Lawrence K. Altman, Agent at Border, Let in Man with TB, N.Y. TIMES
(June 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/01/health/01tb.html?ref=andrewspeaker
(discussing the refusal of a border patrol agent to detain Andrew Speaker).
237. Stobbe, supra note 227.
238. Fallow, supra note 232, at 85.
239. Stobbe, supra note 227.
240. Proposed Bills, supra note 18.
241. Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 23,
2014).
242. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012) (making it a criminal offense to unlawfully distribute
controlled substances).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6a (2012).
244. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071 (2012).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012).
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the current supply of antibiotics, develop new antibiotics, and halt the
spread of antibiotic resistant infections through quarantine.246 Hopefully the
President will not need to employ the legal options proposed in this Article.
Absent action by Congress to specifically address the problem, however,
the President should employ all legal solutions at his disposal to rectify this
pressing and important problem.

246. See Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept.
23, 2014) (ordering various executive agencies to use all of the authority at their disposal to
combat antibiotic resistance).

